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THE EMERGENCY CONSTITUTION IN THE POST-
SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD ORDER
THE CONSTITUTION AS BLACK BOX DURING
NATIONAL EMERGENCIES: COMMENT ON
BRUCE ACKERMAN'S BEFORE THE NEXT
ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM
Martha Minow*
INTRODUCTION
Panic in the face of danger is an understandable human response. Yet, as
fiction author Katherine Paterson has written, "[T]o fear is one thing. To let
fear grab you by the tail and swing you around is another."'  Bruce
Ackerman's book, Before the Next Attack,2 is to be commended for urging
us to guard against overreactions to terrorism and for proposing detailed
safeguards to confine overreactions. Also admirable are the book's
thorough analysis of the United States' current confrontation with terrorism
and the book's reliance on historical examples from around the world to
justify the author's proposals. Nevertheless, the book contains a serious
flaw: The book shifts from a frank acknowledgment of the problems
generated by confronting terrorism to a kind of utopianism that ignores
many of those very problems. Ackerman's work, in other words, alternates
between pessimism and optimism. Perhaps such shifting is an occupational
hazard of advocating for civil liberties in the shadow of terrorist threats.
My thoughts below on Ackerman's book will no doubt betray a similar mix
of pessimism and optimism. Part I discusses five of the book's most
important contributions, while Part II criticizes the book's analyses,
especially in light of recent U.S. experiences. Part II also argues that
"security," not Ackerman's theory of "emergency," should be the
conceptual foundation guiding the government's policies against terrorist
threats. Finally, Part III develops policy changes that are needed for the
* Jeremiah Smith, Jr., Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Katherine Peterson, Jacob Have I Loved 63 (Harper Trophy 1990) (1980).
2. Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of
Terrorism (2006).
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U.S. to advance security as what once may have seemed like a short-term
confrontation with terrorism becomes recognized as a chronic condition.
I. ACKERMAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS
Before the Next Attack makes five significant contributions: (1)
anticipating fear and overreaction to terror; (2) developing concrete plans
that could be valuable in a crisis and could sharpen the public's sense of
priorities; (3) predicting the long-term consequences for our constitutional
democracy from short-term responses to terrorism; (4) subjecting all of the
government's policy initiatives regarding terrorism to constitutional
analysis; and (5) rejecting "war" and "criminal justice" as the legal
justifications for the United States' responses to terror. The paragraphs
below discuss these contributions further.
Ackerman's first contribution is addressing two genuine features of
human fear: overreaction and poor judgment in a crisis. Our Constitution's
framers proceeded with frank acknowledgement of human self-interest and
used it deliberately in the institutional design of our government.
Ackerman similarly acknowledges human self-interest in describing the
risks of overreaction to terror. A more detailed treatment of psychological
reactions to fear, however, would clarify the scope of the risks and
potentially identify resources for institutional reform. We know that fear
makes us overreact and misjudge. For example, Cass Sunstein has recently
canvassed the empirical research about human perceptions of risks and
attending fear.3 Sunstein describes how people think that risks that they can
imagine are especially likely to actualize, regardless of evidence, and how
people tend to focus on worst-case scenarios without discounting for
probability. Furthermore, people tend to focus on immediate risks rather
than any long-term risks created by responding to danger. Although
Ackerman did not incorporate such psychological research in his analyses,
his work helpfully examines historical evidence of overreaction to terrorism
and security threats during the Roman Empire, during the American Civil
War, during Britain's handling of Northern Ireland, and during the
European response to 9/11. These examples typify political overreaction to
terrorism. The examples also offer Ackerman the chance to distinguish the
types of threats to a polity's existence: threats that warrant the most drastic
measures from lesser threats. Ultimately, Ackerman argues that the 9/11
attack, and a possible next attack, fall in this lesser category.
Ackerman's second contribution in Before the Next Attack is hedging
against predictable panic by suggesting concrete plans that anticipate a
terrorist attack against the United States. Here he emphasizes the distortion
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle 35-63
(2005).
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of judgment exercised in the midst of emergencies and works out in
advance contingency plans for maintaining government operations in case a
dirty bomb or other assault destroys part of a city or a group of key
governmental actors. Making such plans in advance is both wise and
crucial4 because human beings do not think well in emergencies. 5
Ackerman not only calls upon us to do the thinking in advance; he provides
guidance with highly specific plans to put into effect in the case of the next
emergency. This kind of contingency planning is vital. Motivating
officials and voters to adopt anticipatory plans is a true challenge, however,
for the forces of inertia and denial operate here at least as much as they
explain why so few people prepare for their deaths by writing wills.6
Hence, Ackerman joins Congressman Brian Baird in outlining a line of
succession in the event that terrorist acts incapacitate state governors,
congressional representatives, senators, or U.S. Supreme Court Justices. 7
Ackerman also calls for a "supermajoritarian escalator" through a
framework statute to control presidential power by requiring increasing
numbers of congressional votes to extend emergency measures over time. 8
Throughout his book, Ackerman seeks to ensure that counterterrorism
measures suspending usual rights are only temporary.
Ackerman's third contribution is championing long-term analysis in an
effort to ensure that short-term responses to terrorism neither destroy nor
erode national constitutional values. This is why he calls for successively
escalating majority-vote requirements before Congress can authorize
extensions of emergency powers to the executive branch. I admire the
impulse behind this important recommendation, but I doubt its practicality
on several levels. Even if the political will could be mustered to adopt such
a provision, nothing would prevent Congress from abandoning the
provision's terms by a simple majority when it comes time for the
supermajority vote. Moreover, the capacity of Congress to act as an
effective check would be impaired because the executive maintains the
power to control information about terrorist threats and to shield abuses of
executive power from politicians and journalists. Furthermore,
contemporary events in the United States rebut the assumption that the
passage of time would quell the sense of emergency justifying the
4. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 88-90 (describing how the constitutions of
Poland and South Africa mandate that any state of emergency has a limited duration
extendable only by the legislative branch).
5. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 3, at 206 ("An understanding of the dynamics of fear
helps explain why individuals and governments often overreact to risks to national security.
A readily available incident can lead people to exaggerate the threat.").
6. See Joel C. Dobris et al., Estates and Trusts 62 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that most
Americans die without wills); Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 319, 336-40 (describing the demographics and attitudes characterizing testate
and intestate individuals).
7. Ackerman, supra note 2, at 142-68.
8. Id. at 80-83.
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suspension of usual restrictions on governmental power. The most obvious
recent evidence is Congress's recent affirmation and expansion of
broadened executive powers with the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT
Act five years after 9/11.9
Ackerman's fourth contribution is to treat the totality of policy initiatives
responding to terror as relevant to constitutional analysis. He rightly points
out that all of these initiatives affect the viability of constitutional rights and
checks and balances. Nevertheless, the details of Ackerman's specific
statutory framework for contingency planning and his proposal for the
supermajority escalator are less important than the recognition that the
Constitution must not be forgotten when developing statutes and practices
to confront terrorism. How we arrange our governance to deal with
terrorism will define us; the extent to which we are able to mobilize and
activate congressional and judicial monitoring will determine whether the
checking function of the branches will persist and whether watchdogs for
individual rights will have a voice. More fundamentally, establishing
distinct statutory bases for the response to terror will make it conceptually
and politically easier to sever the governance practices responding to
terrorist threats from the law permitted by the Constitution. The laws
responding to terrorism that are permitted to persist beyond short-term
crises must reflect our deepest commitments. In this context, even statutory
and regulatory proposals should be understood as part of our "constitution,"
for they will come to constitute us.
A fifth vital contribution of Ackerman is rejecting "war" and "criminal
justice" as paradigms for the U.S. responses to terrorism after 9/11. He
convincingly demonstrates how the rhetoric of war escalates both fear and
executive power without sufficient evidence. He similarly points out the
fatal flaw of framing counterterrorism within the conception of criminal
justice: Criminal justice does not offer a context for taking national
precautions or for preventing further catastrophe, nor does it speak to how
individual rights should be treated outside of criminal prosecutions.
In rejecting the paradigms of war and criminal justice, Ackerman
proposes that the U.S. couch counterterrorism measures within the
framework of responding to an "emergency." Unfortunately, his own
arguments expose the insufficiency of his proposed framework. Precisely
because the terrorist threat has no obvious end-point, the concept of an
''emergency" is inadequate to the challenge at hand and would be
inadequate even in the immediate aftermath of another attack. 10 The crucial
challenge now is to reject the faulty view that we can and must sacrifice our
9. Charles Babington, Congress Votes to Renew Patriot Act, With Changes, Wash.
Post, Mar. 8, 2006, at A3. The renewal produced only a slight restriction in the use of
subpoenas without judicial approval in libraries. The renewal also made permanent all but
two provisions and enlarged federal power to engage in secret surveillance of phones,
records, and homes of terrorist suspects. Id. For other examples from recent U.S. practice
that provide further grounds for doubting Ackerman's presuppositions, see infra Part II.
10. See Ackerman, supra note 2, at 58-60.
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commitment to fundamental rights for what is imagined to be a temporary
emergency: The problem is not temporary and the solution is not
abandonment of our fundamental commitments. Thus, as I will argue
below, a better framework is "security," which is sufficiently ample to
encompass both the advancement of our physical safety and the
preservation of the very rights that are essential to our security. Sorting out
the book's strengths and problems requires more criticism.
II. CRITIQUES IN LIGHT OF RECENT U.S. EXPERIENCES
Before the Next Attack contains flashes of optimism. Unfortunately, the
book's optimism is at best utopian and at worst irrelevant to the actual
scene. This is perplexing because Ackerman pitches the project as a
realistic one, cautioning against ostrich behavior. Yet, as discussed below,
his key proposals are disconnected from real politics. Ultimately,
Ackerman's proposals are better seen as a heuristic device framing
potentially useful analyses, rather than as practical solutions.
One example of his proposals' disconnect from real politics comes from
his discussion of congressional oversight committees. Ackerman's
discussion begins by acknowledging the Bush Administration's efforts to
keep detentions and surveillance secret and to press for more secrecy. In
that context, Ackerman recommends that congressional oversight
committees be guaranteed minority members.' 1 This recommendation
seems both insufficient and unrealistic. The secret use of undisclosed off-
shore detention centers and domestic surveillance techniques emerged from
journalist reporting and government leaks-not from congressional
oversight. 12 Similarly, journalists and officials uncomfortable with the
Administration's practices were responsible for bringing to public attention
the Administration's use of coercive interrogation techniques.13
Such events indicate that there is no assurance that the Administration
will be forthcoming with anyone in Congress. Nor is there strong reason to
believe that when (as now) the same political party controls both Congress
11. See id. at 83-87.
12. Committee Schedules Hearings on Bush Censure, Seattle Times, Mar. 25, 2006, at
A5 (describing how the Senate Judiciary Committee is to hold hearings on Senator Russ
Feingold's proposed censure of President Bush after the disclosure of his domestic spying
program); Eric Schmitt & Carolyn Marshall, In Secret Unit's 'Black Room, 'A Grim Portrait
of U.S. Abuse, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2006, at Al. The Administration threatened to
prosecute those responsible for leaking information, while journalists received awards for
uncovering the information. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, White House Trains Efforts on Media
Leaks; Sources, Reporters Could Be Prosecuted, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2006, at A1; Robert D.
McFadden, Articles on C.LA. Prisons and Katrina Win Polk Awards, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21,
2006, at B4 (reporting awards to journalists who uncovered secret CIA prisons in Europe).
13. See Jane Mayer, Annals of the Pentagon: The Memo, New Yorker, Feb. 27, 2006, at
32-41. President George W. Bush finally acknowledged the existence of such secret prisons
in a speech announcing the transfer of those detained in them. Deb Riechmann, Bush Admits
the CIA Runs Secret Prisons, ABC News, Sept. 7, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2403673.
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and the executive branch, the congressional majority will push for, or
acquiesce to, a proposal to guarantee involvement of minority members in
crucial oversight work. 14 Furthermore, it is far from clear that "minority"
here includes individuals with real capacity for skepticism, motivation to
engage critically, and distance from the Administration. For example, after
leaks from the Administration revealed the Administration's secret
domestic spying program, the Democrats' flabby resistance to the program
came to light. 15 Republicans such as Senator Arlen Specter, even in
arranging a compromise to exempt the domestic spying program from
previous legal restraints, have exercised as much critical oversight over the
program as the Democrats, if not more. 16 Thus, an important question
confronts Ackerman: How would minority party members summon
sufficient independence and courage to provide meaningful review of the
executive, given little evidence of such abilities in the past? The U.S.
experience since 9/11 gives no indication that time's passage strengthens
political or judicial resistance to the fears raised by terrorism.
Ackerman's proposed compensation for erroneous detention is another
example of a disjuncture between his suggestions and the U.S. experience
since 9/11. Let us put to one side the political feasibility of generating
sufficient support for compensating detainees.17 A more devastating defect
of Ackerman's proposal is its reliance on transparency and self-restraint-
precisely the qualities lacking in the current Administration's behavior.
How is the public to learn about the conduct warranting compensation when
the government insists on keeping the conduct secret? Consultation with
congressional leadership about antiterrorism responses occurred in secret.
Even hearings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court remain
undisclosed. When the public learned that this court's secret procedures
were ignored by a domestic surveillance initiative, Congress debated
retroactive authorization rather than recompense for those affected by it.18
Even if there was political will to pursue Ackerman's compensation idea,
who would be in a position to know who deserves it and to ensure that those
eligible actually get it?
A further disjuncture between Ackerman's book and the U.S. experience
since 9/11 becomes apparent through his treatment of the case of Jose
Padilla. Ackerman wrote with hope that the case of Jose Padilla would
return to the Supreme Court and offer the opportunity for protecting U.S.
14. See Carl P. Leubsdorf, Republicans Have Been Reluctant to Stand Up to the
Administration, Dallas Morning News (Online), Feb. 9, 2006,
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/columnists/cleubsdorf/stories/DN
-leubsdorf_09edi.ART. State.Edition I .c616e57.html.
15. Jeff Zeleny, Democrats Leary of Call for Censure: Rebuke of Bush May Backfire,
Some Fear, Chi. Trib., Mar. 17, 2006, § 1, at 3.
16. See Charlie Savage, Deal on Spy Program in Works: Bill Would Let Court Approve
Wiretaps, Boston Globe, Feb. 28, 2006, at A3.
17. Cf Ackerman, supra note 2, at 51-56 (discussing issues surrounding compensating
detainees).
18. Emily Bazelon, Legalize It?, Boston Globe, Feb. 19, 2006, at El.
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citizens from limitless detention. Ackerman is not to be faulted for failing
to anticipate precisely how the Bush Administration would maneuver in the
case of Padilla, but this history offers a sober contrast to the book's
optimism.
Padilla is a U.S. citizen who was arrested in the United States (at O'Hare
Airport) and detained not with charges but with suspicion of plotting a dirty
bomb attack. Padilla became a central focus of the fight over executive
power in the response to terrorism. As the Administration held him in
detention without charges, it claimed the courts lacked authority to hear
Padilla's habeas corpus challenges. The Supreme Court asserted its power
to hear habeas petitions from "enemy combatants" held in detention without
charges, but the Court dismissed an initial petition on the technical ground
that the petition named the wrong government official and was filed in the
wrong court. As a second petition, correcting that error, worked its way
back to the Supreme Court, the federal government transferred Padilla from
military detention with no criminal charges 19 and then urged the Supreme
Court to dismiss the case as moot.20 The government chose at this moment
to charge him not with terrorism, violence, or even conspiracy to commit
violence. Instead, as of this writing, Padilla stands charged with playing a
role in a conspiracy to support terrorist groups overseas. 21 If Padilla posed
such great danger as to warrant the extraordinary measures of arresting a
U.S. citizen on U.S. soil and holding him without charges, the transfer to
civilian prison with no charges of terrorism or allegations of violence seems
like a considerable fallback position for the government. Furthermore, the
government's treatment of Padilla echoes the Administration's decision to
release Yaser Hamdi (conditioned on his return to Saudi Arabia and his
agreement to give up U.S. citizenship) after the Supreme Court held that the
military had to provide him with a hearing about his detention as a
suspected terrorist and enemy combatant. The treatment of Padilla and
Hamdi raise real questions about the capacity of checks and balances to
work even several years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The events surrounding Padilla and Hamdi also raise doubts about
whether the executive branch can exercise power with responsibility,
19. In a fascinating turn of events, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit-
which had approved the military detention with charges-opposed the government's motion
for an "eleventh-hour transfer" because it jeopardized Supreme Court review of the matter.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Let U.S. Transfer Padilla to Civilian Custody, N.Y. Times, Jan.
5, 2006, at A22.
20. Adam Liptak, Alito Vote May Be Decisive in Marquee Cases this Term, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 1, 2006, at Al. It is not clear why the Administration so fears Supreme Court review,
especially with two new appointees. Note that Justice Alito hired as a law clerk a former aid
to former Attorney General John Ashcroft who helped to craft the Administration's policies
in response to 9/11. Charles Lane, Alito Hires as a Clerk Former Ashcroft Aide: Lawyer
Played Key Role at Justice Dept., Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 2006, at A12.
21. Despite the history of intense security concerns, the federal district court judge
directed that Jose Padilla should not appear in handcuffs in court unless the Administration
can demonstrate that he poses a specific security risk. Vanessa Blum, Federal Judge Orders
Padilla's Cuffs Removed, Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 4, 2006, at 8B.
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restraint, or candor once a terrorism crisis abates. David Cole voices such
doubts in citing the failures of the Administration to identify a single Al-
Qaeda cell in the United States or to generate convictions through the
massive use of preventive techniques. 22 One could go further and ask
whether whatever gains have been secured through the Administration's
actions-including the use of detention without charges, the denial of
access to attorneys, the use of secret prisons, and the use of coercive
interrogation-outweigh the injuries that these actions pose to our
international image and our own principles. By abandoning legal rules in
the treatment of suspects, we may even inspire more rage against the United
States and fail the test posed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in
2003: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting,
training and deploying against us?" 23
In sum, the behavior of the executive, the Congress, and the courts in the
United States since 9/11 cast serious doubts about three key presuppositions
in Ackerman's book: (1) that as time passes after a major terrorist attack,
the executive will permit sufficient information about its conduct to enable
congressional and judicial oversight; (2) that Congress will exercise more
independent checks on executive power; and (3) that minority party
leadership, if given a voice, will check majority party power grabs.
Because of these doubts, as well as the chronic nature of terrorist threats so
well described by Ackerman, the framework of "emergency" is insufficient
as a way to cabin the powers of the executive. This would be true whether
the "emergency" is understood as the ongoing crisis unleashed since 9/11 or
instead as a new "emergency" triggered by a next attack.
Hence, Ackerman's central proposals-the escalating supermajority
requirement to renew and extend executive authority, compensation for
those wrongfully detained, and permission to suspend fundamental
guarantees against detention without due process or the protection of
sufficient governmental suspicion-are both practically implausible and
conceptually insufficient protections for national and individual interests.
As an alternative, I offer "security," broadly conceived, as the alternative
for responding to terrorism. Here I mean to join Ackerman in rejecting the
frameworks of war and criminal justice as the proper legal understandings
of terror. Yet "security" rather than "emergency" more aptly expresses and
implements these wise lessons that Ackerman himself explores: Proposals
must (1) anticipate fear and overreaction to terror; (2) develop concrete
22. David Cole, Are We Safer?, N.Y. Review of Books, Mar. 9, 2006, at 15 (reviewing
Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a
Strategy for Getting it Right (2005)).
23. Rumsfeld's War-On-Terror Memo, USA Today (Online), May 20, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm (reprinting a
memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, dated October 16, 2003, posing this question along
with other inquiries about how to measure success and failure in the global war on
terrorism).
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contingency plans that could be valuable in a crisis and can sharpen the
sense of public priorities; (3) attend to the long-run consequences for our
constitutional democracy from short-term responses to terrorism; and (4)
treat the totality of policy initiatives responding to terror as relevant to
constitutional analysis, as all the initiatives affect the viability of
constitutional rights and checks and balances.
III. THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION
Responses to terrorism should reject the rhetoric of war and the paradigm
of criminal justice. Following Ackerman's book, I believe that such
rejection is the starting point for responsible counterterrorism analysis. I
also follow Ackerman in treating the entire collection of national policy
responses, not only judicial interpretation of the Constitution, as germane
constitutional analysis. Furthermore, anticipating the predictable
overreactions of panic and fear is a central imperative that entails
maintaining a long-term view about the effects of short-term reactions.
All of these elements add up, in my mind, to the obligation to enhance
national security directly and effectively both before a next attack on U.S.
soil and after such an attack, should one occur. Surprisingly, this central
meaning of "security" is not the watchword of U.S. policies, despite the
elaborate organizational shuffling involved in the creation of a Department
of Homeland Security. For, as many learned reports and commentators
have noted, the U.S. response since 9/11 has left woefully unaddressed key
areas of vulnerability to terrorism. These include (1) the continued
disorganization of intelligence resources and inadequate capacity to
infiltrate, interpret, and analyze terrorist cells and domestic and
international Arabic sources;24 (2) the continued exposure of ports and
container transport to terrorism;25 (3) the continued failure to secure nuclear
material domestically and internationally; 26 and (4) the inconsistent
regulation of materials that could be used in bioterrorism. 27
Thoughtful and specific proposals for strengthening national security
abound. For example, in The Next Attack, Daniel Benjamin and Steven
Simon argue for improving the nation's intelligence capacity; identifying,
capturing, and disrupting terrorists; safeguarding nuclear materials and
dangerous weapons to keep them from hands of terrorists; identifying and
24. See generally 9/11 Comm'n, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
25. See Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to
Protect Us from Terrorism 81-110 (2004).
26. See Nat'l Research Council, Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security 2-3 (2006),
available at http://newton.nap.edu/catalog/l1377.html. See generally James L. Ford & C.
Richard Schuller, Controlling Threats to Nuclear Security: A Holistic Model (1997);
Rensselaer W. Lee III, Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former
Soviet Union and Europe (1998).
27. See, e.g., Joshua Lederberg, Introduction, in Biological Weapons: Limiting the
Threat 5-7 (Joshua Lederberg ed., 1999).
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protecting the most vulnerable targets in the country, including container
cargo at shipping ports, water supplies, and chemical plants; and reducing
the creation of new terrorists by addressing their grievances.2 8  The
intelligence capacity in the nation remains in need of serious improvement,
given the continued documented rivalries and inefficiencies that impaired
interpretation and action before 9/11. Professional intelligence analysts
who predict that terrorists like Zacarias Massaoui will fly a plane into the
World Trade Center should get a hearing at the highest levels. If this does
not occur, then there is something deeply broken in the intelligence
apparatus.
Rigorous understanding of the scope and meaning of "security" should
inform policy. National security in a democracy entails not only protecting
borders and citizens from physical threat, but also promoting democratic
accountability and respect for human rights. This broader conception,
exemplified by the approach to counterterrorism pursued by Canada, rejects
the assumption that the nation must sacrifice human rights for security and
instead treats both physical security and human rights as indispensable to
national security. One reason given by the Canadian government for this
treatment is that adherence to human rights reduces terrorists' ability to
recruit: "The first line of defense in countering terrorist recruitment is the
promotion of accountable, democratic governments that respect human
rights, allow for peaceful dissent, take action to fulfill the aspirations of
their people, and respect diversity." 29 The commitment to human rights
enforcement runs deeper, however, as an element of personal security.
When Irwin Colter served as Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada, he explained that there is no contradiction between the protection
of security and the protection of human rights because each point in the
same direction: toward the protection of personal, national, and
international security.30  Hence, intelligence efforts, border security,
transportation security, and emergency planning must each comport with
the due process and the rule of law by consistently prohibiting torture, by
refusing to single out minorities for discriminatory treatment, and by
adhering to clear sunset provisions for preventive detention and
investigatory hearings.31
28. See generally Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of
the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting it Right (2005).
29. Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade Canada, Canadian Dep't of Foreign Affairs,
Terrorism, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/intemationalcrime/terrorism-en.asp (last visited
Aug. 29, 2006); see also Gov't of Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada's National
Security Policy (2004), available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/
NatSecurnat/natsecurnat e.pdf.
30. Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, On the Occasion
of an Appearance Before the Special Committee of the Senate on the Anti-Terrorism Act
(Feb. 21, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2005/doc_31398.html.
31. Id.
[Vol. 75
THE CONSTITUTION AS BLACK BOX
This conception of national security32 is implicit in the constitutions of
South Africa and Poland, both of which have provisions specifying
fundamental rights that must be respected even during an emergency
declared under those constitutions. 33 Ackerman notes these provisions, but
he does not endorse them. This is surprising. If your goal is to minimize
incursions on fundamental civil liberties during emergencies, specifying the
rights that must be respected even during an emergency would seem to be
one of the most direct ways to minimize jeopardy to constitutionalism in the
fight against terrorism. Even if one predicts that the government, including
the courts, will not comply one-hundred percent with such commitments to
preserve fundamental rights, embracing a conception of security that
includes protecting rights-and specifies rights that cannot be undermined
even in urgent contexts-seems a good place to start in reducing long-run
jeopardy to rights.
Instead, in the absence of a rights-protecting provision, the United States
government placed in charge of the Department of Homeland Security
Michael Chertoff, the very individual who called for the round-up of
Muslims, resulting in widespread mistreatment of detainees and not one
charge related to terrorism.34  The Administration has systematically
bypassed warrant requirements, arrogating law enforcement and
surveillance to itself without judicial supervision, in advance of
congressional or judicial approval for this practice. 35 The lawyers for the
White House have pursued legal arguments to permit cruel, degrading
treatment in interrogation and detention. 3
6
32. Such a conception of national security bears a modest resemblance to the United
Nation's effort to build a conception of human security, exemplified by the 2003 Final
Report of the United Nations Commission on Human Security:
Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms-freedoms that are the
essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive
(widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on
people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social,
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people
the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.... [Human Security]
encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care
and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her
own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty,
achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom
from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural
environment-these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore
national, security.
U.N. Comm'n on Human Sec., Human Security Now 4 (2003), available at
http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf (internal quotations
omitted).
33. See Ackerman, supra note 2, at 88-90.
34. William Finnegan, Comment: Homeland Insecurity, New Yorker, Feb. 7, 2005, at
30.
35. Lowell Bergman et al., Spy Agency Data After Sept. 11 Led FBI to Dead Ends, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 2006, at Al.
36. See generally The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel, eds. 2005).
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These are failures of leadership, not exigencies demanded by an
emergency. Albert J. Mora, the outgoing general counsel of the U.S. Navy,
authored a memo detailing his failed efforts to halt the policy of authorizing
cruelty in the treatment of terror suspects. He explained,
[P]eople were afraid that more 9/lls would happen, so getting the
information became the overriding objective. But there was a failure to
look more broadly at the ramifications. These were enormously
hardworking, patriotic individuals. When you put together the pieces, it's
all so sad. To preserve flexibility, they were willing to throw away our
values. 37
"Throwing away" our values is not only sad; it also jeopardizes the security
that the Constitution is intended to ensure. Panic during emergencies is
understandable. That is why Bruce Ackerman has performed a crucial
service in pushing lawyers, political leaders, and citizens to think before the
next terrorism crisis and to devise a plan that, in the event of a crisis,
protects safety and maintains a commitment to law. The conduct of law
and politics in the United States since 2001 suggests; however, that we need
to think more about safeguarding fundamental rights and less about
assuring executive power. We need to think more about promoting checks
and balances and the disclosure of information necessary to do so, rather
than expecting that time's passage will generate more resistance to
executive prerogatives.
To combat terrorism, the government will no doubt continue discussions
and decisions secluded from public view. But even so, those who govern in
our name should pursue both physical security and the protection of human
rights. For that, we need the activism and engaged participation of judges
and congressional leaders in checking and overseeing executive actions,
albeit often through in camera proceedings and closed sessions.
Some may wonder what in camera oversight affords. Here, even in my
most pessimistic moments, I would urge that judicial and congressional
involvement, in secret or closed sessions, is necessary. The sheer fact that
executive action will have to be justified to others alters the decisions made
within the executive branch. And even if much that we value is sacrificed
in the meantime, at least such sessions hold out the possibility of review
sometime in the future, assuming enough of us and our commitment to law
and rights survive. The ability to review these sessions is rather like the
"black box," or cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, located on
airplanes and required by the National Transportation Safety Board.38
These devices can record engine sounds, conversations, and technical
navigational information; in case of an accident, these devices help
37. See Mayer, supra note 13, at 41.
38. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., History and Mission, www.ntsb.gov/ABTNTSB/
history.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
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investigators determine what went wrong.39 Perhaps genuine planning for
our security calls for establishing a National Security Safety Board,
analogous to the National Transportation Safety Board, and directing it to
investigate breaches of both our security and the human rights essential to
that security. Our policies and our Constitution should be this kind of black
box, monitoring what is done in our names, for our own safety. For if
immediate public debate and review is curtailed due to exigent
circumstances and due to the demands of security itself, there must be
subsequent occasions for evaluation and review, even in closed sessions,
both to deter governmental misconduct and to give the nation the chance to
learn from its experience. Government agents, even when acting with the
best of motives, will not be as careful when they know that nobody is ever
going to review their conduct than when they know someone will hold them
accountable. Like the cockpit "black box," our policies must keep
sufficient record of all that is done to permit assessment later. Our policies
and our Constitution must not be determined by an unknowable decision
maker that remains forever a mystery.
We should take our fear as the prompt to protect ourselves and our
values. Otherwise, in our predictable panic, we may jettison what we care
about and give our enemies grounds to expose our hypocrisy or, worse,
celebrate what they made us become. After 9/11, we will always be living
before the next attack. As the short-run becomes the long-rm, let us make
sure to sharpen, not dull, tools of accountability and democracy. 40
39. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Cockpit Voice Recorders (CVR) and Flight Data
Recorders (FDR), www.ntsb.gov/aviation/CVRFDR.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2006)
(providing information on requirements established by the National Transportation Safety
Board, an independent federal agency charged by Congress with investigating every civil
aviation accident in the United States).
40. Unfortunately, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 undermines the tools of
accountability by sharply curtailing independent judicial review of executive detentions of
non-U.S. citizens once the executive characterizes them as enemy combatants. See Warren
Richey, New Lawsuits Challenge Detainee Act, Christian Sci. Monitor (Boston), Oct. 6,
2006, at 1.
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